I. THE CANONICAL REMEDY

A. Suits by the Executor
The remaining records of the Church courts show that executors sued frequently to recover property owned by the decedent and money owed to him. The ecclesiastical courts' refusal to observe the royal rules can be seen easily from two unexceptional examples. In 1377 the executor of Alexander Hall sued John Stryk of Chesterton before the bishop's Consistory court at Ely for ten marks Stryk had allegedly owed to Hall. Stryk appeared before the court. He did not contest the court's jurisdiction. He did not introduce a royal prohibition, as he was entitled to do under common law. Instead he admitted the debt, and when at a later date he still had not paid, he pleaded only "that he was poor and stricken with poverty so that he had been unable and still was unable to pay out the aforesaid sum."' At Rochester in 1439 the executors of William Clyft of Offham sued John Palmer before the Consistory court on a simple debt which Palmer had owed to Clyft. Palmer defended by alleging payment in the testator's lifetime. At least at first he did; the cause was later compromised. The essential point is that neither defendant made the response which the royal court rule would lead us to expect. Both apparently accepted that the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over the claims in favor of the decedent's estate. 9 It is impossible to give reliable figures for the number of such suits heard by the medieval Church courts. Act books, which furnish the only surviving record of litigation in most dioceses, were basically records of procedural steps taken in each matter coming before the courts, and they normally described each case only in general terms as a "testamentary cause." Besides a testamentary debt case, the term was sometimes used to refer to a dispute over a testament's validity, a claim for a legacy, or other matter falling within probate jurisdiction. Only when the court scribe set down some of the details of litigation can one be sure of the underlying nature of the suit. Fortunately this happened often enough to show that testamentary debt was a common subject of litigation. Of the twenty-eight testamentary causes heard at Canterbury in 1517, for example, five clearly concerned testamentary debt, although most of the rest cannot be The normal elements of a suit by the executor on the decedent's claim were the following: he alleged 1) his appointment as executor of the testament, 2) the commission of administration to him by the Church court, 3) the transaction which created the debt in the testator's lifetime, 4) his request for payment by the debtor, 5) the debtor's refusal to pay, and 6) his consequent inability to carry out 10. Taken from Act book Y.2.6, fols. 30v-65r; the five causes are found at fols. 33v, 59v, 61r, 61r, and 63v.
11. E.g., Belchambyr c. Moundevyle, Act book Ep I/10/1, f. 99v (1507 Once the debt was proved, the judge ordered the debtor to pay, under threat of excommunication. The debtor was considered an "impeder" of the decedent's testament. The theory was that his detention of the decedent's assets (the money owed) made full administration of his estate impossible.27 For this reason, the Church courts drew no clear distinction between recovery of the testator's chattels and recovery of debts owed to him.28 Also for this reason the Church enjoined the frequent reading in parish churches of the Provincial Constitution excommunicating all those who impeded the last wishes of decedents, including the decedent's debtors.29 Surviving depositions show that this was no empty injunction. The parish clergy in fact read the Constitution publicly.30 To carry out fully the last wishes of the decedent, the Church courts had to retain some jurisdiction over testamentary debt. As a contemporary clerical spokesman put it, "The final expediting of a testament ought to be one and undivided."3' So it seemed at any rate to many Churchmen and litigants in the later Middle Ages. to an average of 10 between 1536 to 1538.49 Although this proves nothing conclusively, it is at least reasonable to suppose that the decline in total numbers reflects the dropping out of litigation about debts from the courts' testamentary jurisdiction. There is no reason to suppose that the disappearance must have occurred in every place at exactly the same time. Suits over testamentary debt may well have ceased in the dioceses of Norwich and Winchester,50 for instance, while the Consistory court at Lichfield was still hearing them.51 But taken together, the evidence from seven or eight dioceses suggests that the disappearance had occurred by the second decade of the sixteenth century. That is, the common law position that debts owed to and by testators were not testamentary causes, and were not cognizable in the courts of the Church, had come to describe the true state of affairs by the late 1520's.
E.g., Canterbury Ecclesiastical Suit
Exactly how this change occurred must remain, at least for the present, a matter of some uncertainty. There is no sign of a fundamental shift in the royal position. It had long held that suits over testamentary debt belonged to secular jurisdiction, even though, as noted above, writs of prohibition had not been effective to prevent the Church from hearing testamentary debt claims.
However Second, the disappearance from the Church courts of testamentary debt left a gap in remedies available to litigants with legitimate claims. It particularly hurt the decedent's creditor who had no written obligation, for as noted above, without it he could not sue the executor at all in debt.62 Occurring prior to the time assumpsit for money came into common use, this disappearance of the ecclesiastical remedy left him with no recourse outside Chancery. 63 The executor with a claim against a debtor was better off, since he could bring debt; however debt could be met by wager of law on the defendant's part, and the executor with witnesses to the contract may well have been better off in the Church courts, where he could prove it by witnesses. 64 This dilemma was ended, as legal historians have often noted, by the expansion of assumpsit during the course of the sixteenth century. Assumpsit allowed the creditor to sue the debtor's executor. It allowed the creditor's executor to sue the debtor and have the issue tried by jury. 65 In light of the evidence from the Church court records, perhaps it was no accident that the expansion of assumpsit to include promises to pay money occurred when it did. The expansion was the work of men, not a matter of any inherent necessity, and the practical problems facing litigants with valid claims but no satisfactory remedy outside Chancery may have provided some impetus for attempts to stretch assumpsit to cover the situation.66 As long as the Church courts provided adequate recourse, common law rules like the one which kept debt on an oral contract from being brought against an executor were tolerable rules. Once the Church had lost its jurisdiction, they were harder to live with. The resources inherent in the secular law had to be exploited to fashion a remedy.
Third, the decline in ecclesiastical jurisdiction must be tied to the fundamental religious changes of the sixteenth century. It is particularly noteworthy that the decline occurred gradually, and that it happened mostly prior to the Henrician Reformation. In the broadest sense, the decline therefore reflects a basic shift in attitude towards 
